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
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
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
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THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
MOBILIZATION STUDY

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY INTERFACE DURING
MOBILIZATION

by

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A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty
in
Fulfillment of the Research Requirement

Research Supervisor: Lieutenant Colonel Charles B. Sabin, USA

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ABSTRACT OF STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT
INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

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G Bruce Eveland, LTC, USA Michael B. Howe, LTC, USA Ronald H. Sandwina, GM-15, FEMA	The DOD/FEMA Interface during Mobilization
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	REPORT NUMBER
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ABSTRACT

Problem Statement: This paper investigates the existing and proposed interfaces between the Department of Defense and the Federal Emergency Management Agency during peacetime and periods of mobilization. Areas addressed include working relationships, transition plans, emergency authorities, prototype crisis and resource mobilization management structures and existing mobilization/preparedness documentation.

Findings/Conclusions: The industrial preparedness and emergency mobilization capabilities of the United States cannot, at the present time, meet DOD wartime resource requirements.

1. DOD and FEMA do not have realistic estimates of essential military and civil wartime requirements.
2. Critical item and material priorities must be established and joint DOD-FEMA industrial preparedness planning undertaken with the resource industries.
3. Identification of long lead time components, prestocking of critical raw materials and production, bottle-neck planning are essential to insure expeditious and efficient mobilization.
4. DOD and FEMA have a working relationship that needs to be expanded and exercised more frequently.

Recommendations:

1. Mobilization exercises should be conducted on an annual basis to insure continuity and expertise maintenance at all levels of participation.
2. The Crisis Management Organization in OSD should be fully incorporated into the OSD structure.
3. Mobilization exercise development, training, funding and preparation responsibilities must be incorporated into the annual planning of each federal agency.
4. The use and understanding of Emergency Authorities must be restudied, organized and revived annually within all federal agencies.
5. The warning and readiness levels for all government agencies should be standardized.
6. All federal agencies, Congress and selected industries should participate in annual mobilization training exercises.

THIS ABSTRACT IS UNCLASSIFIED

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The following contributors deserve particular recognition and special thanks from the group for their interest and assistance:

MG B. Lewis - DOD
Mr. Craig Alderman - OSD
Mr. Joe Moreland - FEMA
Col Robert Rumph - MCDC-NDU

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

National security rests on our nation's ability to act quickly and decisively, whether politically in support of our national interests, militarily in defense of ourselves and our allies, or economically in marshalling our resources. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Department of Defense (DOD) are the two major federal agencies which dictate how quickly we can accelerate our national mobilization process. These two agencies and their interface during mobilization are the focal point of this paper.

However, this appearance is deceptive. Critical analysis was done in researching previously published reports regarding the interface of these two agencies, and the current concerns surfaced in the past year. By no means, is this an all conclusive report.

A capsule glance of the key conclusions and recommendations reveals FEMA and DOD are making considerable strides in improving this interface. It is recommended that top management at both agencies must continue to institute a program to eliminate, the "we/they syndrome." Both agencies are extremely important to our national security and therefore must be responsive to each others requirements.

Some of the conclusions and recommendations for future action include:

1. The industrial preparedness and emergency mobilization capabilities of the U.S. cannot, at the present time meet projected DOD wartime needs. This is due to many factors, but the single most important factor seems to be the inability or unwillingness of the DOD and FEMA to determine and specify essential military and civilian wartime requirements.

2. The Crisis Management Organization in OSD should be fully incorporated into the OSD organizational structure. This includes funding, space and adequate area communications to support this activity. Its value to quickly coordinate high level matters will pay great dividends in future exercise and actual scenarios.

3. The OSD structure should be modified to have a Chief of Staff position during both periods of peace and war. This would insure timely and responsive analysis of each critical crisis issue. This would also enhance DOD interagency coordination and focus critical issues.

4. The Department of Defense must become more responsive in determining its critical mineral resource requirements.

5. The mobilization plans, procedures and general guidelines within FEMA all need immediate revision. Most are in draft and some are 10-20 years out of date.

6. The approach to and utilization of Emergency authorities must be restudied, organized, jointly agreed upon, and promulgated to all participants prior to the next exercise. Utilization of these authorities must be schooled and understood at the highest levels.

7. The warning and readiness levels for all governmental agencies should be standardized. This should not be left to any interpretation.

8. All federal agencies and Congress should participate in annual mobilization exercises. Industry should be invited and funded to participate on a selected basis.

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INTRODUCTION

The capability of this nation's defense industrial base to economically produce and respond to surge and mobilization defense production requirements on a timely basis is a major element of our national strength and deterrence. National security rests on the nation's ability to act quickly and decisively, whether politically in support of our national interests, militarily in defense of ourselves and our allies, or economically by marshalling our resources. Our national policy for war centers on retaining military power necessary to achieve victory. Such power stems basically from a strong mobilization base of manpower and resources within a healthy economy. American history repeatedly illustrates that the success attained by U.S. forces is directly attributable to the industrial capability of this country. While sustaining military support, it was also necessary to sustain a demanding civilian economy. The principle that has emerged is that the nation provides the military with the necessary requirements with the least amount of disturbance to the civilian economy.

CHAPTER I

SHORT-WAR/LONG-WAR AND SURGE

Before considering the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) interface and whether the DOD and FEMA planners share a common understanding of surge and mobilization requirements, a general discussion of the short-war/long-war debate and its influence on surge and mobilization is appropriate. The short-war proponents contend that in any likely conventional war with the Soviet Union (Europe or elsewhere) their attack could be contained and actual combat would be of short duration (on the order of--days--months?). This concept, sometimes called the "come as you are war" emphasizes forward stockpiling to support the initial conflict. The short-war proponents contend that in the event neither side gains the advantage, there would be sufficient reaction time to replenish stocks from the industrial base during the stalemate period before combat resumed.¹

On the other hand, the long-war proponents argue that we cannot afford to assume that any war with the Soviets will be of a short duration and, therefore, advance preparation must be made for a lengthy period of combat (on the order of--months--years?). The long-war concept relies on the historical evidence that the United States' greatest wartime asset has been its ability to mobilize manpower, industry and the economy to provide the vast quantities of material needed to support the war effort. They simply contend that a total mobilization capability can provide a credible deterrence.

It was determined through interviews, that the most difficult problem currently facing FEMA and DOD planners is defining what surge really means. How do we determine what the surge requirements are? Is surge a reaction to something? What? Should industry be given goals and specified schedules for certain surge levels? Only recently, our government has addressed and developed a partial solution to this surge problem. It is called contractual surge. It obligates the contractor to make advance plans and take those actions necessary to insure delivery of a predetermined quantity of items or services within a given period of time. FEMA and DOD believe this is the initial step in solving the surge problem.

The debate then is between the degree of knowledge and extent of surging, mobilizing, availability of foreign raw materials, and stockpiling measures are required before the conflict begins, and how rapidly we can mobilize our defense industry to support a long war.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (PAGES 1-2)

¹Defense Readiness Force Sustainability and Industrial Preparedness,
August 1980.

CHAPTER II

NATIONAL DEFENSE RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

The U.S. has always been dependent upon foreign sources for some raw materials. However, as new technologies emerged and domestic industries became multinational corporations, U.S. dependency on external suppliers for finished products, components, and raw materials increased substantially. The implications of this dependency in terms of U.S. national security were recognized early and resulted in the passage of the Stockpiling Act of 1946, the National Security Act of 1947, and the Defense Production Act of 1950. These acts, or at least substantial portions thereof, are still in effect today...and they are needed more than ever.¹ Why? Because they provide the principal peacetime legislative means to mobilize U.S. industry in support of our national defense requirements. They also provide the basis and necessary authority for the establishment of essential management structures and procedures needed in times of national emergency.

The problem confronting the U.S. today is that the industrial preparedness and emergency mobilization capabilities of the U.S. are inadequate to respond to the wartime needs for military items and essential civilian requirements.² Even the recent initiatives by the Department of Defense (DOD) to improve industrial responsiveness,³ and the National Security Decision Directive 47 (NSDD-47) on Emergency Mobilization Preparedness,⁴ are seemingly inadequate to address the morbidity that characterizes U.S. peacetime preparedness plans and programs. "We are dealing for the most part

in a complex, dynamic, and interdependent world of the commercial marketplace where anticipated profits, projected firm workload and backlogs, and stability are the primary motivating forces behind responsiveness and change.⁵

Consequently, what we find is:

- a. a growing inability to satisfy our defense requirements using U.S. domestic sources,
- b. a mobilization preparedness environment that is somewhat hostage to the international marketplace, and
- c. an industrial preparedness base that probably couldn't meet defense requirements in a timely manner.

To complicate matters further, there are the usual budget constraints, state of the economy, and the impracticality to "produce military items at wartime levels during peacetime."⁶

While most of the studies on industrial preparedness, surge, and mobilization conducted over the past few years generally support the foregoing perspectives, there are some doubts about the extent of the resultant U.S. vulnerability. Indeed, there is a reasonable amount of optimism concerning the strength and resiliency of the U.S. economy, domestic and foreign resource availability, and the ability of U.S. industry to respond to national security defense requirements (if only they would be defined). Wilfred Malenbaum, Professor of Economics at the Wharton School, "does not foresee limits to growth imposed by materials exhaustion."⁷ Michael Calingaert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, indicates that strategic minerals dependency "does not necessarily translate into

vulnerability.⁸ Michael Shafer, teaching fellow in the Department of Government at Harvard University, in his article "Mineral Myths" indicates that:

- a. "The United States could lose a substantial portion of its strategic minerals imports without facing any threat to its national security," and
- b. "Past experience (does not) indicate that long-term supply reductions necessarily threaten U.S. weapons systems."⁹

During a recent mobilization conference¹⁰ one prominent industry representative suggested that there is no industrial preparedness problem, or at least no perception of such a problem by industry. He explained that until DOD can be more explicit in terms of its industrial requirements there is no problem and no basis for industrial planning. Dr. John D. Morgan, Jr., Chief Staff Officer, Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior, made a similar suggestion in his lecture "Global Interdependence and U.S. National Security: Non Fuel Minerals," presented to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, September 23, 1982. "The problem now confronting the Department of Defense is how to get some defensible estimates of future requirements when multifarious war plans are required to meet a broad spectrum of contingencies. These contingencies ranging from minor insurrections to global nuclear devastation, and future service roles and missions are not completely defined."¹¹ The U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded essentially the same thing: "Two essential elements of DOD's industrial preparedness program -- item selection and requirements determination -- are not being

performed consistently by the services."¹² "Although item requirements are to form the basis for planning with industry, the requirements developed by the services are not a sound basis for industrial planning."¹³

While it appears that the necessary legislation and emergency government structures are in place and satisfactory, DOD's problem of specifying its own unique requirements raises some doubt as to the validity of the broader resource management process.

The Carter Administration created the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and through the issuance of Presidential Directive/NSC-57 assigned FEMA the responsibility for coordination of the entire national mobilization planning process. The Reagan Administration reviewed the progress of the previous administration and subsequently established the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) chaired by the Secretary of the National Security Council (NSC). FEMA remained as the principal coordinator of national resource preparedness and management. In effect, FEMA is charged with essentially the same responsibilities as the original National Security Resources Board (NSRB) created under the National Security Act of 1947. As such it occupies a key position from which it is expected to evaluate the economic impact of all mobilization requirements, and represent the interest of the civilian economy in terms of essential non-military material requirements. In this regard, FEMA must coordinate with the DOD to ensure a complete understanding on the part of the military as to the nature and extent of the essential nonmilitary requirements to support any war effort.

Suffice to say that FEMA is in the same predicament as the DOD, i.e., it is unable to identify essential civilian requirements with any degree of specificity. This is obvious from an analysis of changes in requirements in the strategic stockpile objectives from the early 1950's to the present. Since these stockpiling goals represent the difference between essential requirements and total mobilization (wartime) availabilities from other sources, and since there has been no substantive revision to either the goals or the stockpile itself over a period of some 30 years, the credibility of mobilization planning and resource management is suspect. Moreover, the DOD-FEMA requirements determination interface appears virtually non-existent.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER II (Pages 3-7)

¹For elucidation see E. V. Karl and W. Fedorochko, "A Contemporary Approach to Three Real World Problems: Near Term Readiness, Surge, and Mobilization," National Defense University, 1981, pp. 1-18.

² U.S. General Accounting Office Report to Congress, "DOD's Industrial Preparedness Program Needs National Policy to Effectively Meet Emergency Needs," (PLRD-81-22), May 27, 1981.

³DOD Task Force to Improve Industrial Responsiveness, Summary Report, March 1982.

⁴NSDD-47, Emergency Mobilization Preparedness, July 22, 1982.

⁵Ibid., p. 13.

⁶GAO Report PLRD-81-22, p. 5.

⁷Wilfred Malenbaum, "Resource Shortages in an Expanding World," Wharton Quarterly, Winter, 1973.

⁸Michael Calingaert, "U.S. Strategic Minerals Dependency," Department of State Bulletin, April 1981.

⁹Michael Shafer, "Mineral Myths," Foreign Policy, Summer 1982, pp. 154-171.

¹⁰Mobilization Conference, "Reconciling Mobilization Capabilities and Strategic Needs in the 80s," Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., November 29-30, 1982.

¹¹Dr. John D. Morgan, "Global Resource Interdependence and U.S. National Security," a paper presented to the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Ft. McNair, Washington, D.C., September 23, 1982, p. 10.

¹²GAO Report PLRD-81-22, p. 33.

¹³Ibid., p. 24.

CHAPTER III

MOBILIZATION PHASES

As we are aware, the President establishes national policy for mobilization and war. He does this with and through the National Security Council and such other arrangements as he may require to advise and assist him. These policies become the basis for further programs and actions.

Most statutes on federal agencies books that authorize mobilization require the triggering action of a national emergency declared by the President, national emergency declared by Congress, a special Congressional enactment, or a Congressional declaration of war. However, the President does have limited mobilization authority that does not require such triggering action.

One of the most important statutes is the Defense Production Act (DPA) of 1950. The DPA provides the basic authority for much of our defense mobilization preparedness efforts. Under Executive Order 10480, the Director of FEMA provides overall direction and control for the DPA mobilization program.¹ Based on the DPA, both FEMA and DOD share a responsibility to maintain reasonable levels of industrial preparedness. The DPA's usefulness was demonstrated during the Korean and Vietnam periods where there was never any significant shortage of civilian goods, and military requirements in terms of manpower, materials, and industrial production were satisfied. In meeting

the demands during those periods the authorities granted in the DPA were used for the:

- a. establishment of priorities in performance under contract or orders,
- b. allocation of material and facilities for production of designated capacity, and
- c. expansion of production capacity.

Planning, assessing and achieving preparedness for national mobilization are complex problems which are further compounded by semantic difficulties.

For example, planners in FEMA and DOD continue to misinterpret the definition of mobilization and its meaning of total or maximum mobilization. History has shown that this country has never been subject to total mobilization. The mobilization experience in World War II was a high level of mobilization, but it was not as extreme or as rapid as could be envisioned if an immediate, all-out effort was demanded.²

The most recent, national mobilization exercise, Proud Saber 82, was designed to evaluate our capacity to mobilize our manpower and expand our industrial surge capacity and base. The scenario began by identifying hostile powers taken increasingly threatening and provocative action at our national security interest and safety. The President declared a National Emergency and urged completion of mobilization preparedness for coping with the resulting economic disruptions. He ordered emergency mobilization of the national resources to meet national security and other measures to expand our economic viability and productive capacity. An "exercise" Executive Order, was

implemented directing the FEMA Director, on behalf of the President, to coordinate all mobilization activities of the Executive Branch of the Government.

As the exercise began to intensify and the requirement to address additional resource-related issues in a more senior interagency forum materialized, the FEMA director established the Emergency Resources Board (ERB). The ERB consisted of high level representatives of the Resource and Claimant Agencies having essential roles in mobilizing the nation's resources in a National Security Emergency. The ultimate goal of the ERB was to achieve balanced decisions committing requirements against available resources.

To provide continuity and make resource assessments, the Director, FEMA expanded the Office of Emergency Resources (OER) to encompass the Emergency Resources Management activities. The organization had the responsibility to react to pre-established phases in order to respond to National Security Emergencies (see figure 1). The following describes each of these phases.

Phase I - Peacetime Phase

In this phase, FEMA exercised its coordination of the Emergency Resources Planning program with all the federal agencies which is outlined in Executive Order 10480. In addition, FEMA provided policy and implementation guidance for the various emergency provisions of the DPA - Titles I, III, and VII.³ They include:

- a. Priorities and allocations
- b. Voluntary agreements
- c. Machine tool trigger orders
- d. The NDER
- e. Plant and production expansion incentives.

Phase II - Preparation Phase (Partial Mobilization)

This phase FEMA exercised coordination for increased Emergency Resources programs and increased activity under the DPA resulting from increased military mobilization and production including:⁴.

- a. Surge actions
- b. Filling war reserves worldwide
- c. Increased FMS requirements
- d. Increased requirements to equip and supply full force structure.
- e. Increased requirements of industrial sectors to support military production.

Phase IIIA - Conventional Phase (Full Mobilization)

Here FEMA exercised coordination for further increased Emergency Resources programs and also further increased activity under the expanded DPA.⁵

Phase IIIB - Conventional Phase (Total Mobilization)

FEMA has the same responsibility in this phase as in Phase IIIA, except that direct economic measures were required due to providing military requirements for total mobilization and still supply civilian economic needs.⁶

In reviewing FEMA's current organization chart (figure 2), dated 10 December 1982, and strength augmentation phase chart (figure 3), there appears to be an excessive strength difference between Phase II and Phase IIIB. It is unlikely FEMA could employ 15,555 employees and train them during Total and/or Full Mobilization Phases. Under normal conditions FEMA may be able to hire and train the 2,500 employees at Phase II.

It is recommended FEMA consider: viewing all phase strength figures and their job descriptions, and consolidating directorates and/or transferring directorates to other federal civilian departments or agencies.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER III (PAGES 9-12)

¹Implementation of Exercise Executive Order to Assign Resources
Mobilization Responsibilities to the Director of FEMA, October 16, 1980.

²Defense Production Act Amendments-October 25, 1982, p. 10.

³Ibid., p. 11.

⁴Ibid., p. 12.

⁵Ibid., p. 12.

⁶Ibid., p. 12.

CHAPTER IV
PLANNER INTERFACE

There are literally hundreds of statutory provisions that require a presidential declaration of national emergency in order to become effective. Some are applicable only in time of war, and others apply during various types of national emergencies. Some apply only to the military or to other specified federal departments and agencies. Others provide special authority to the President who then designates one or more Federal agencies to carry out the function. Currently, it appears that the DOD and FEMA have the most comprehensive and current list of emergency authorities which are available for review and can be cited. However, there currently exists no consolidated document which accurately lists the authorities/statutes of all the federal agencies. Also, many of the existing authorities/statutes are seemingly not well understood or known to all the agencies.

In a recent interview with a member of the legal council of FEMA, he stated that FEMA has been tasked by the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB) to research, identify and consolidate for publication all statutes and authorities currently existing among all federal agencies. They predicted it could take as much as a year or more to just consolidate the list, after which it could take an additional year or two to review each authority/statute to see whether it still applies to national emergencies.

As previously mentioned the principle authority for industrial preparedness planning emanates from the DPA of 1950 with amendments, which

provides the foundation for plans and programs for emergency industrial production. Executive Order 11490 assigns emergency functions to various Federal departments and agencies and, in Section 401, delegates to the DOD the responsibility for the planning and administration of industrial preparedness. Specifically, it directs DOD to:

- a. Develop plans with industry for procuring and producing selected military equipment and supplies to fulfill emergency requirements, and
- b. Take necessary action to overcome problems such as surging and developing an adequate mobilization base.

DOD Planner Responsibility:

The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering is the principal assistant to the Secretary of Defense on all matters relating to the capability of the industrial base to meet the peacetime surge and mobilization production requirements of DOD and administer the industrial resource program. As an example, he collects, consolidates data provided by industry, and develops a comprehensive analysis of the industrial base's ability to respond to peacetime surge and mobilization requirements.

In addition, he coordinates with the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative Affairs) and the FEMA to:

- a. Insure that steps are taken to identify laws, regulations and procedures that could hinder timely efficient acquisition of critical items.
- b. Establish or propose systems of waivers or reliefs from such laws, regulations and procedures which could be put into effect in an emergency.
- c. Surveys administrative leadtime to process waivers, and recommends means to reduce these leadtimes.

d. Recommend changes to existing laws, proposed new laws and authority, or comment on proposed laws or regulations as appropriate.

FEMA Planner Responsibilities:

While DOD plays the principle role in determining military requirements and acquiring needed defense articles, the FEMA plays a critical role in overseeing and coordinating mobilization planning and actions. FEMA's basic authority is to develop plans for:

a. Industrial and civilian mobilization to maximize the nation's manpower in time of war.

b. The stabilization and conversion to a wartime footing of the civilian economy.

c. Unifying the activities of federal departments and agencies engaged in activities important to the war effort or mobilization.

e. Rationalizing potential supplies of and requirements for manpower, and resources and production facilities.

f. Establishing adequate reserves of strategic and critical materials, i.e., the National Defense Stockpiles.

g. The strategic relocation of industries, services, government and other essential economic activities.

FEMA has become increasingly effective and responsible for coordination of the entire mobilization planning process at the national level in peacetime. Their broad coordinating powers in peacetime appears adequate and is particularly enhanced by its leadership role in orchestrating the mobilization process. DOD's close cooperation with FEMA is assisting in refining this

process. Jointly, both agencies planners in the last two major mobilization exercises have conducted Industrial Preparedness planning to assure the capability of sustained production of essential military items to meet the needs of the United States and Allied Forces during surge situations or national emergencies.

Interviews with DOD/FEMA planners revealed they shared a common understanding of functional management responsibilities which they feel are critical to the successful execution of the mobilization process. Interaction and coordination between DOD, FEMA and other federal/state agencies will be critically important during any national emergency. In order to test this coordination effort, all federal agencies must exercise and revise the emergency statutes and plans independently and jointly.

CHAPTER V

MOBILIZATION MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE

During 1982, the fourth mobilization exercise since 1976 was conducted and involved most of the federal departments and agencies. Only OMB did not take a full role in the exercise. Pre-exercise activities began in March and culminated in a 12-day active phase during October and November 1982.

EMERGENCY RESOURCES BOARD

In preparing for the 1982 PROUD SABER/REX 82 Mobilization Exercise, FEMA issued a draft "Resource Mobilization Plan 1982" which revised and upgraded the Limited War Plan of 1967. This draft plan provided current concepts and a functional organization to implement emergency responsibilities, duties and functions assigned to the Director of FEMA by Presidential Executive Order, after the declaration of a national emergency and mobilization. Within this authority, the Director of FEMA establishes the Emergency Resources Board (ERB) to accomplish the following:

- a. Advise the Director of FEMA in resolving resource problems not resolved by FEMA or other resource agencies.
- b. Provide centralized management of the economy to insure national goals are met with minimum disruption to existing processes.
- c. Prioritize and allocate national resources to balance Defense, Industrial and Civil emergency requirements.
- d. Provide economic stabilization if required to all markets.

e. Enhance continuity and expansion of essential industrial production through the use of incentives, deregulation, financing and other appropriate programs.

Authorities under which the board is authorized to consider critical resource areas and issues are:

Public Laws

National Security Act (NSA)

Defense Production Act (DPA)

Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpiling Act

Executive Orders

10480 Administration of the Defense Mobilization Program

11490 Emergency Preparedness Functions

11179 National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER)

12148 Federal Emergency Management (FEMA)

12155 Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile

Presidential and NSC Papers

PD 57 Mobilization Planning and Preparedness (Source Book)

NSDM 337 Stockpile Policy and Planning

NSDD 47 Emergency Mobilization Preparedness

The Director of FEMA chairs the ERB and it is comprised of the Under or Assistant Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, the Interior, Commerce, Agriculture, Labor, Health, Justice, Housing, Transportation, Energy, and Education; and the heads of OSTP, FRS, GSA, CEA, OMB, and others as the

Director of FEMA may designate. The decisionmaking process of the board focused on major issues forwarded by the member agencies/departments and the FEMA Director. Issues requiring decisions beyond the board's authority are forwarded to the President with board recommendations. An Executive Secretariat supports all board functions and provide the necessary administrative support for each session.

During Exercise REX-82 BRAVO, the ERB met five times with the following agendas:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>SUBJECT AREA</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
13 Oct 82	Orientation	Old Executive Office Building
27 Oct 82	Economic and Financial Issues	Main Treasury Building
30 Oct 82	Military Force Expansion, Deployment and Sustainability Support	Old Executive Office Building
3 Nov 82	Resource Management for Surge Production and Industrial Mobilization	Old Executive Office Building
5 Nov 82	Wrap Up	Old Executive Office Building

At the ERB Wrap Up session, most of the participants were in agreement that the ERB was a "step in the right direction" for mobilization management. Better pre-exercise preparation, improved information displays during the exercise, and more action and less debate were noted by a consensus as deficiencies. Wrap-up comments also included:

- a. "Each agency should look back and recapture the mobilization data developed over the last forty years."

- b. "During an actual scenario, daily, small ERB meeting would be envisioned supported by good staff work."
- c. "Coordination between agencies must be expedited and real world data should be used in future exercises."
- d. "Coordination between FEMA and the Department of Defense must be improved."
- e. "ERB did not resolve financial issues and financial data must be better displayed to the participants."
- f. "A need for more timely development of military exotic metal requirements must be resolved."

Decisions and outcomes made at the various ERBs did not appear to filter down to the various sub-forums, i.e., CMO or the Inter-Agency Emergency Coordination Group (IECG). This would indicate a need for better top-down information flow to insure timely coordination at all levels.

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY RESOURCES

Under the same emergency authority, the Director of FEMA is authorized to establish an Office of Emergency Resources (OER) to assist him in executing his responsibilities. The OER will consist of the following:¹

- a. Directed by an Associate Director (Presidential appointment, approved by Congress) reporting directly to the head of FEMA.
- b. Support the Director of FEMA in the following areas:
 - (1) Direct, control, coordinate mobilization and allocate the nation's resources.
 - (2) Apply economic stabilization controls if necessary.

- (3) Support development of fiscal and monetary measures.
- (4) Direct Federal agencies and departments to carry out mobilization responsibilities as prescribed by the amended Defense Production Act, Executive Order 11490 and other appropriate authorities.
- (5) Develop and support advice provided by the Director to the President on mobilization goals and objectives.
- (6) Insure state and regional coordination on priorities and urgent resource requirements.
- (7) Releases from the national stockpiles of strategic and critical materials.
- (8) Insure coordination in all phases of government procurement production, distribution, manpower, services, and other stabilized programs.

FEMA has made several assumptions concerning the future of the OER. Once established, after a national security emergency, the OER will remain within the FEMA organization and existing organizational elements will serve as cadres for expansion. The expansion of the office will be directly proportional to the existing mobilization phase and workload (see figure 1). Organizational deviations will hinge upon changes in the national situation and occurring events. To supplement the FEMA cadre, augmentees will come from the National Defense Executive Reserve (NDER), Reserve Agency Specialist and the Industrial sector.

Within the OER, the Director of Emergency Resources will:

- a. Assist in the formulation of national resource goals to meet the mobilization requirement.

- b. Provide guidance on reserve use and program development.
- c. Administer a system for program decisions involving, manpower, materials and facilities for:
 - (1) Military requirements.
 - (2) Non-military foreign requirements.
 - (3) Civilian and industrial needs.
 - (4) Adjudicating conflicting resource claims.
 - (5) Resolving interagency resource issues.
 - (6) Allocation of manpower.
 - (7) Resource priorities and distribution.
 - (8) Stockpile releases.
 - (9) Economic stabilization.
 - (10) Protection of essential industries.
 - (11) Support of natural disasters.
 - (12) Support of the Emergency Resources Board.
 - (13) Status of mobilization activities.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION

The Office of the Secretary of Defense is primarily organized in a peacetime configuration that is not designed to handle large scale, fast-paced crisis situations. During the mobilization evolution since 1978 the need for expeditious, crisis management at the OSD has been documented in several exercise after-action reports. Recognizing this need, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) directed the Systems Research and Applications Corp. (SRA) to identify critical crisis activities of OSD, JCS and the

Services and develop a prototype crisis management organization that could be tested during exercise PROUD SABER-82.

"The Crisis Management Organization (CMO) (see figure 4) was created as a standby organization to be activated at the call of the Secretary of Defense. Its purpose is to facilitate coordination and decisionmaking for those crisis management activities in which OSD principals below the level of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary play a role."² This organization can be used as a transition model if the crisis warrants an expanded and more permanent vehicle as a situation would develop. Key factors in this concept included:

- a. No change in command relationships between and within the Department of Defense structure.
- b. CMO is a staffing facilitator for OSD.
- c. CCG provides a central OSD contact point, timely crisis management, interagency coordination, current world situation status and crisis management documentation.

As part of the CMO, the Crisis Management Council (CMC) was designed around the Secretary of Defense, and supporting principals--the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy), the Under Secretary of Defense (Research and Engineering), and the Assistant Secretary of Defense (MRA&L). Service Secretaries, the Director of DIA, General Counsel and other assistant secretaries will be invited as appropriate.

Action procedures supporting the decision process were redefined to enhance and expedite coordination. With the USD(P) acting in the capacity of OSD Chief of Staff, a timely prioritization of crisis issues insures

appropriate processing for recommendations/decision formulation. Actions being processed by the OSD staff would formulate Secretary of Defense Guidance to JCS, but would not be involved with force strengths or operational plans. A major advantage of this prototype organization is that it allows immediate involvement of JCS, the Services and FEMA in the OSD staffing process.

Policy issues impacting jointly with DOD and FEMA would receive immediate attention through the key OSD representatives and the FEMA liaison in the CMO. Issues such as the accession of reservist, conscriptees and their significant impacts on defense industries would be determined. Critical resource requirements could be rapidly accessed based upon the world situation and forwarded to FEMA for resolution. The massive non-combatant evacuations from overseas, their reception processing, and ultimate CONUS relocation would require massive federal coordination.

In addition to the liaison officer within the CCG, FEMA representatives were to participate on several of the supporting CMO boards. They attended exercise meetings of the Logistics and Material Board and the Manpower Board.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER V (Pages 17-24)

¹FEMA Draft Mobilization Plan, dtd October 1982.

²Final Report on the Prototype OSD Crisis Management Organization (CMO),
20 May 1982, VADM E. A. Grinstead, USN, for DUSD(P).

CHAPTER VI

GENERAL EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS

During the Exercise, the mission of the CMO and its functions seemed well defined and operating efficiency was achieved in a minimum startup period. The organization developed sufficient information to keep the Under Secretary of Defense (Policy) abreast of scenario developments as they occurred. Supported alternatives for decisions of the Chairman of the CMC were prepared, approved, and implemented.

Communication with FEMA during the exercise could have been greatly improved. Since the CCG was an prototype operation, this can be easily corrected through permanence and the development of an on-call facility. FEMA has already recognized their deficiencies in this area and is almost ready to move into a larger and more efficient operation's center in 1983. The necessity of immediate access to secure communications between the FEMA LNO and FEMA headquarters is essential. The handling and distribution of messages at both ends of the exercise seemed slow and at times confused. Throughout the exercise, personnel attending the IECG meeting complained that they had never received various exercise messages. In one instance, a message announcing an invasion and the beginning of hostilities could not be found in the FEMA operations center and the FEMA LNO did not have a copy nor was he aware of its existence until questioned by observers.

Throughout the exercise it was very apparent in every forum that a real understanding of Emergency Authorities was lacking. Previous exercise after-action reports commented on the same deficiency:

"Current emergency authorities given to DOD and the civilian agencies are neither comprehensive nor balanced."¹

"Interagency Memorandum of Understanding covering support operations during emergencies frequently are unclear or not current or simply do not exist."²

"Emergency authorities revealed a lack of concise, up-to-date, and readily available information about the authorities available to the president and other government executives."³

During the after exercise, First Impression Session, it was noted by many that little progress had been made since PROUD SPIRIT-1980.

FEMA was established in 1979 and continues to operate in the mobilization and emergency preparedness areas with documents, plans and procedures that were developed by the Office of Emergency Preparedness in the 1960s. This deficiency has been noted on a number of previous mobilization exercises.

"Nifty Nugget made salient the fact that existing mobilization plans were a hodgepodge of old and unconnected Presidential emergency orders, policies, regulations, and procedures."⁴

"Previous exercises clearly demonstrate a need for more and better mobilization authorities, plans and procedures."⁵

The draft mobilization plan with its new procedures, guidelines and replacement organizations (ERB, OER) that were used during REX-82 BRAVO were an initial step that should receive positive followup and expansion. Specific procedural and policy guidelines should be revised and/or established to insure the same deficiency does not continue to exist in the advent of an actual emergency or subsequent exercise.

John J. Fialka in his article on PROUD SPIRIT quotes General Kerwin, USA

(Ret):

"A gap still exists between the Office of Secretary of Defense requirements and FEMA's capabilities. FEMA and Defense don't speak the same language. FEMA is not organized to handle the requirements or to exercise defense priorities established by the President."⁶

Some progress has been made within FEMA through several structural reorganizations (one as late as December 1982, see figure 2).

Service comments in their first impressions of the PROUD SABER-82 exercise included the following:

"The CMO brought needed improvement to DOD coordination and decisionmaking under crisis conditions."

"CMO should be institutionalized by USD(P)."

"PROUD SABER underlined many anomalies, disjoints and voids in emergency authorities available to DOD and Federal Civilian Agencies under crisis conditions."

"Lack of smooth administrative systems between OSD, State, FEMA, OJCS and White House caused to many delays in information flow for timely decisions."

"DOD has not developed a coherent program to seek necessary legislative and regulatory relief."

"Apparently there is no readily available list of defense emergency authorities to be included in the declaration of national emergency."

All of these have validity and unfortunately the negative have the same tone as previous exercise results.

In January 1983, a Mobilization Conference was conducted at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University. One segment of the conference addressed mobilization management specifically. As previously mentioned, key members of industry expressed concern over their non-participation in mobilization exercises. Industry will not plan for mobilization unless they participate and are schooled on the direction and plans of DOD and FEMA.

Also voiced were concerns that the Office of Emergency Resources (proposed replacement for ODR) should be located within the White House. This would insure sufficient authority/clout during a fast paced emergency. It would also force FEMA as an agency to equally compete with other agencies as a resource claimant. Some concern was also expressed with the decision/appeal levels of authority under this proposed scheme of operation (see figure 6).

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER VI (Pages 26-28)

¹NIFTY NUGGET After Report, 1978, 30 June 1980, p. 10.

²Ibid., p. 11.

³Ibid., p. 12.

⁴Ibid., p. 8.

⁵Final Report Functional Interface Between the Department of Defense and FEMA January 1981, DOD/FEMA Interface working group and the Systems Research and Applications Corporation, Annex B, p. B-1.

⁶Parameters, Vol. 10, March 1981: pp. 38-41, J. Fialka, John J., "The Pentagon's Exercise 'Proud Spirit': Little Cause for Pride." p. 41.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

1. The industrial preparedness and emergency mobilization capabilities of the U.S. can not, at the present time, meet projected DOD wartime needs. This is due to many factors, but the single most important factor seems to be the inability or unwillingness of the DOD and FEMA to specify essential military and civilian wartime requirements. A realistic determination of total mobilization production requirements is necessary. Item and material priorities must be established and joint DOD-FEMA industrial preparedness planning undertaken with the essential industries. Attention should be focused on selected priority items and material requirements, with special emphasis upon:

- a. the capacity for processing raw materials through the finished product,
- b. pre-stocking such raw materials and component parts, and
- c. identification of critical production and final assembly lead-times.

The bottom line is that the DOD and FEMA must take the initiative in defining industrial preparedness and mobilization requirements. Industry must know what is expected, what the priorities are, and what funding is available to support the level of industrial preparedness required. Industrial interdependence and the vagaries of the international marketplace have much less influence upon the responsiveness of U.S. industry than does the absence of a statement of requirements.

2. General conclusion from participants in recent exercises, visiting both federal agencies, interviews with National Defense University students and independent studies have provided the following:

- a. There currently is an excellent working relationship between DOD and FEMA.
- b. Functional areas requiring coordinating linkages are now taking more definitive form.
- c. Surge and mobilization planning requirements are being included when DOD and FEMA planners consider future acquisition needs of manpower and material.
- d. There was never any doubt that FEMA assumed the major player role in the recent Proud Saber/Rex Bravo 82 exercise. One can only surmise that FEMA along with all federal agencies gained considerable knowledge because of this exercise. To evaluate FEMA now and state whether FEMA can effectively transition and chair effectively its various emergency organizations will only be determined when the overall exercise results are studied and published.

If implemented these initiatives should have a significant impact in improving industrial responsiveness and defense production efficiency. However, vigorous action at top levels of FEMA and DOD management to assure continued rapid and meaningful implementation of surge and mobilization programs would be in the best interest of our government.

CHAPTER VIII
RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Mobilization exercises should be conducted on an annual basis. This would improve the participant expertise at every level and counter the general lack of experience caused by high personnel turn over both in the military and civilian sectors.
2. The Crisis Management Organization in OSD should be fully incorporated into the OSD organizational structure. This includes funding, space and adequate area communications to support this activity. Its value to quickly coordinate high level matters will pay great dividends in future exercise and actual scenarios.
3. Mobilization exercise development, training, funding and preparation responsibilities must be incorporated into the annual planning of each federal agency. Exercise activities must receive proportional interest if the needed crisis and emergency procedures are ever to achieve a creditible level.
4. The OSD structure should be modified to have a Chief of Staff position during both periods of peace and war. This would insure timely and responsive analysis of each critical crisis issue. This would also enhance DOD interagency coordination and focus critical issues.

5. The Department of Defense must become more responsive in determining its critical mineral resource requirements.
6. The mobilization plans, procedures and general guidelines within FEMA all need immediate revision. Most are in draft and some are 10-20 years out of date.
7. The approach to and utilization of Emergency Authorities must be restudied, organized, jointly agreed upon, and promulgated to all participants prior to the next exercise. Utilization of these authorities must be schooled and understood at the highest levels.
8. Personnel stabilization must be achieved in both DOD and FEMA to insure some continuity in the mobilization and preparedness areas. Lack of general expertise was apparent in both DOD and FEMA throughout the exercise.
9. The CMO should avoid being saturated with too many meetings and boards-key players will be siphoned of discussing non-relevant issues.
10. Mobilization responsibilities were not sufficiently pinpointed within OSD prior to and during the exercise.
11. The warning and readiness levels for all governmental agencies should be standardized. This should not be left to any interpretation.

12. The disruption and chaos that will occur in the event of any real activity relocation will have serious impacts on government continuity and routine administration. At the first indication of any real relocation, many government personnel will abandon their positions and try to relocate their families.
13. All federal agencies and Congress should participate in annual mobilization exercises. Industry should be invited and funded to participate on a selected basis.
14. Selected members of the National Defense Executive Reserve should be activated to participate in each exercise.
15. Exercise scenarios should be developed to the extent that sub-level requirements and coordination between divisions of FEMA and the secretariats of DOD is initiated.
16. Situations that are briefed by DOD to the civilian agencies, i.e., the ICCG must be high quality and must convey a realistic impression to the non-military community of the seriousness of a global conflict.
17. The FEMA data base is out of date and must be upgraded to insure support continuity of the government through the post attack and recovery periods.

18. Mobilization exercises must be funded down through the regional levels of the FEMA to insure adequate exercise staffing and participation.
19. Pre-exercise training requirements must be increased at both DOD and FEMA to insure adequate and meaningful exercise preparation. Personnel should be schooled in their exercise functions and supporting documentation must be curve from which to operate.
20. Exercise directives should not contain "no fault" cavets, as this tends to excuse repeated deficiencies that occur in each exercise.
21. Consideration should be given to improve coordination between FEMA regions and area U.S. Army headquarters.
22. Recommend a military planner (O-5 level) as deputy or military advisor to each FEMA region to enhance emergency coordination, mobilization planning and exercise execution.

GLOSSARY

CEA	Council of Economic Affairs
CMC	Crisis Management Council, OSD
CMO	Crisis Management Organization, OSD
DPA	Defense Production Act
DOD	Department of Defense
DRB	Defense Resources Board
DUSD (R&E)	Deputy Under Secretary Defense (Research and Evaluation)
EMPB	Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board
ERB	Emergency Resources Board (Prototype-PS/REX-82)
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRS	Federal Reserve System
GSA	General Services Administration
IECG	Interagency Emergency Coordination Group
MUL	Master Urgency List
NDER	National Defense Executive Reserve
NSDD	National Security Decision Directive
OASD (MRA&L)	Office Assistant Secretary Defense (Manpower, Reserve Affairs & Logistics)
ODR	Office of Defense Resources
OER	Office of Emergency Resources (Prototype-PS/REX-82)
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OSTP	Office Science, Technology & Policy
RAPS	Remedial Action Programs

Definitions

1. National Emergency: A condition declared by the President and/or Congress by virtue of powers previously vested in them which authorizes certain emergency actions to be undertaken in the national interest. Actions to be taken may include partial or total mobilization of national resources for mobilization.
2. Mobilization: Is the act of preparing for war or any other emergency by assembling and organizing material resources. Result from acts by the President and/or Congress.
3. Mobilization Preparedness: Refers to the totality of Federal programs and activities that have as their explicit purpose the enhancement of the nation's ability to mobilize its industrial, economic and human resources in order to provide support to the armed forces and essential civilian activities during conditions of emergency.
4. Partial Military Mobilization: Less than full mobilization. Generate 100% of combat capability of part of force structure, or improve combat readiness of entire force structure.
5. Full Military Mobilization: Generate 100% of combat capability of entire peacetime approved force structure and sustain it in combat.

6. Total Military Mobilization: More than full mobilization. Generate additional combat capability by adding new force structure and sustaining it in combat.
7. Surge: Is the ability of the industrial base to rapidly meet accelerated production requirements of selected items in a peacetime environment; no declared national emergency or mobilization.
8. Industrial Preparedness Planning (IPP): Program plans for the transformation of the industrial base from peacetime activity to emergency program necessary to support national defense objectives.
9. Industrial Base: That part of the total privately-owned and government-owned industrial production and maintenance capacity of the United States, its territories and possessions, as well as its facilities located in Canada, expected to be available during emergencies to manufacture and repair items required by the military services.

MOBILIZATION STUDIES PROGRAM

INITIAL RESEARCH DESIGN (IRD)

1. TITLE: DOD-FEMA Interface During Mobilization
2. REQUESTING AGENCY: National Defense University.
3. SCOPE

The allocation of critical defense resources prior to and during a national emergency must be timely and effective. To achieve these goals, the routine working relationships, transition plans, expanded emergency authorities between federal agencies and newly established crisis management organizations must be analyzed, exercised and refined. This research effort will address the Department of Defense (DOD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and the standby Office of Defense Resources (ODR). The focus of this study will be to analyze and evaluate the current, proposed and standby emergency authorities granted to these agencies. This study will identify key organizational interfaces, and determine if they are compatible, and adequate to achieve the "United States Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Policy" as stated in the National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 47.

4. IMPORTANCE OF THE SUBJECT

In identifying problems in previous administrations and mobilization exercises the industrial surge capability and mobilization process still remains an area of importance to national interest. The Carter Administration created the FEMA, and through the issuance of Presidential Directive/NSC-57 assigned FEMA the responsibility for coordination of the entire national mobilization planning process. The Reagan Administration reviewed the progress of the previous administration, and subsequently established the Emergency Mobilization Preparedness Board (EMPB)

chaired by the Secretary of the National Security Council. NSDD-47 (Jul 22, 1982) reaffirms the importance of mobilization planning, establishes new US mobilization policy, and defines specific policies and programs for the development of a credible and effective capability to manage mobilization.

5. MAJOR PROBLEMS

a. DOD and FEMA planners should share:

- (1) A common understanding of surge and mobilization authorities,
- (2) A common understanding of the peacetime, emergency, and standby authorities, and
- (3) Organization interfaces through which surge and mobilization requirements can be achieved.

b. Are the ODR/OER and DRB/ERB concepts, organization, and mission compatible with DOD resource mobilization and management requirements?

c. What are the relationships between the DOD Crisis Management Organization (CMO), the FEMA Interagency Emergency Coordinating Group (IECG), and the Emergency Mobilization Planning Board?

d. Can FEMA effectively transition to and chair effectively the various emergency organizations (e.g., IECG, DRB/ERB, ODR/OER)?

e. Can essential civilian and military needs during national security emergencies be satisfactorily addressed thru central management of the nation's resources? Is there an adequate methodology to identify defense needs between DOD and FEMA which will facilitate effective utilization of national resources?

f. What DOD-FEMA interface exists to guarantee a partnership with the private sector to ensure an adequate emergency mobilization preparedness capability?

6. TENTATIVE HYPOTHESES

The capability of the US government to mobilize the nation's resources would be significantly improved if the DOD and FEMA would expand ongoing joint planning and exercise activities, better define essential resource requirements, and develop the necessary resource program incentives to encourage private sector participation in mobilization preparedness. FEMA should focus on and coordinate civilian requirements. Military resource planning and mobilization can be best coordinated by the DOD. When conflicting civilian and military resource requirements can not be resolved, they will be forwarded to the Emergency Resources Board (ERB) for adjudication.

7. SOURCES OF INFORMATION

- a. DOD -- OSD/CMO, JCS
- b. FEMA -- HQ & Regional Offices, NPP & GC Staff
- c. EMPS
- d. NDU -- MCDC, Library (resource mobilization plans, public laws, executive orders, Presidential Decisions, NSC papers, Plan D, National Plan, resource management Circulars, Defense Mobilization Orders, and Mobilization Exercise Critiques.

8. POSSIBLE ANALYTICAL APPROACHES

- a. Generic -- historical and analytical survey
- b. Qualitative -- probably not applicable, but communications network analysis might be helpful.

9. ORGANIZATION

The major steps of this research study include:

- a. Preliminary discussion of study topic with principal agencies Faculty Res. Advisor and Research Group
- b. Prepare strawman IRD FRA & Research Group
- c. Participate with MCDC as observer/evaluator in PS/REX-82B Research Group
- d. Finalize & submit IRD Research Group
- e. Assignments to members FRA & Research Group
- f. Agency investigations & survey Research Group
- g. Emergency authority and organizational review Research Group
- h. Writing and in-process review of component contributions Research Group
- i. Synthesize inputs, prepare draft, and edit Research Group with FRA oversight
- j. Preliminary final draft developed and submitted to principal contributors and agencies for review and comment Research Group with FRA oversight
- k. Prepare final draft based on contributor and agency feedback Research Group with FRA oversight/feedback
- l. Complete research study manuscript and submit to FRA Research Group

10. SUBMITTED BY: MSP Group 36

LTC G. Bruce Eveland

LTC Michael B. Howe

Mr. Ronald H. Sandwina

PHASING FOR FEMA'S OFFICE OF EMERGENCY RESOURCES (OER)

PHASE	1. PEACETIME	2. PREPARATION	3A. CONVENTIONAL WAR FULL MOB.	3B. CONVENTIONAL WAR: TOTAL MOB.
ORGAN.	RESOURCES PREP OFFICE, NPPD	RESOURCES PREP DIRECTORATE	EMERG. RESOURCES ADMINISTRATION	OFFICE OF EMERG. RESOURCES
MISSION	PLANNING FOR RESOURCES SUPPORT OF MOB.	MGMT. OF RESOURCES TO SUPPORT PREP. EFFORT	MGMT OF RESOURCES TO SUPPORT FULL MOB.	MGMT OF RESOURCES TO SUPPORT TOTAL MOB.
AUTH.	NAT'L SEC ACT-1947 DEF PROD ACT -1950 as amended STOCKPILE ACT -1979 E.O. 11490 MOB PLANNING 11480 MOB FUNCTION 12148 FEMA 11179 DDER 12155 STOCKPILE	AUTHORITIES IN COLUMN 1	AUTHORITIES IN COL. 1 PLUS: FEMA HAS BEEN ASD: EMERG. AUTHORITIES FOR FULL MOB.	AUTHORITIES IN COL. 1 PLUS: FEMA HAS BEEN ASD EXPANDED EMERG. AUTHORITIES FOR TOTAL MOB.

Figure 1

Federal Emergency Management Agency





Figure 2

FEMA STRENGTH AUGMENTATION

PROGRAM	1	2	3A	3B
PHASE				
MOBILIZATION PREPAREDNESS	18	150	200	200
RESOURCES PREPAREDNESS	40	350	1,900	2,400
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION	7	100	800	2,900
GOVERNMENT PREPAREDNESS	617	2,100	3,000	3,000
CIVIL DEFENSE	706	1,000	2,700	7,300
PEACETIME EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS	575	600	600	600
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION	482	700	1,300	1,600
TOTAL	2,445	5,000	10,000	18,000

Figure 3


OSD CRISIS MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION



* Liaison Provided by FEMA, STATE & JCS.

** FEMA Reps.


FIGURE 4



FEMA HEADQUARTER ORGANIZATION
AT MOBILIZATION PHASE 3B DISPLAY OER
FUNCTIONAL AREAS

FIGURE 5

CRITICAL RESOURCE
DECISION FLOW



* PROTOTYPE ORGANIZATION REX 82 BRAVE

FIGURE 6

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